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The ethics of practical reasoning exploring the terrain
Tony Evansa and Mark Hardyb
aDepartment of Social Work, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, UK; bDepartment of Social Policy
and Social Work, University of York, Heslington, York, UK
ABSTRACT
Social work has been under sustained scrutiny regarding the quality of
decision-making. The assumption is that social workers make poor
quality decisions. And yet our knowledge and understanding of how
social workers make decisions is, at best, partial. In our view,
examination of practitioner decision-making will be enhanced by
considering the role that ethics plays in practical judgement in practice.
Although there has been significant work regarding the role of values
and ethics in practice, this work tends to idealize morality, setting up
external standards by which practice is judged. In this paper, we will
argue that ethics in practice needs to be understood as more than
simply the operationalizing of ideal standards. Ethics also entails critical
engagement with social issues and can challenge idealized statements
of values. We outline the idea of the ethical dimension of practical
reasoning, consider its relationship to professional discretion,
judgements and decision-making and argue that this opens up an area
of investigation that can illuminate the interaction between practice and
ethical thinking and reflection in novel and – for social work, at least –
unconventional ways.
KEYWORDS
Values/ethics; practice/
theory/methods AQ1
¶
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Introduction
For decades now, high profile service failures have undermined trust in social workers and the knowl-
edge base that underpins their practice. The challenges that these ‘extreme failures’ (Epstein, 1996)
pose for the legitimacy of social work are both acute and distinct. Though failures in other areas of
professional practice attract occasional attention, the seemingly unique ‘damned if you do, damned if
you don’t’ situation of social work lends this issue a particular character. The case of ‘Baby P’ in the UK
represents perhaps the most potent recent example of service failure and led to the Munro review of
child protection, which concluded that the ability of social workers to make accurate decisions is
hampered by the burdensome degree of administration and scrutiny that they are subject to and
its concomitant impact on the time available to spend with service users building relationships, learn-
ing about people and analysing their situations. Consequently, practitioners have to make judge-
ments in far from ideal situations, based on less than full knowledge, compounding rather than
alleviating the uncertainty that characterizes the work they undertake. Subsequent reforms in
England have sought to strengthen trust in social work by equipping the profession to deal with
the related issues of the quality of day-to-day practice, and the legitimacy of the profession.
It is not, however just external scrutiny to which practitioners are subject; there are also demands
from commentators within social work. As well as ensuring that their decisions are accurate they must
also ensure that they are ethical. As Banks (2014) makes clear, the ethical ‘turn’ in the social work
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academy over the last few years has occurred partly in response to concerns that contemporary prac-
tice, occurring within a framework of neo-liberal managerialism, is actually unethical (see also McAun-
cliffe & Chenoweth, 2008; Preston-Shoot, 2010, 2011). The scrutiny to which social workers are subject
is thus heightened yet further; not only must practice be seen to be effective, it must also be seen to
be ethical. Ethics, of course, as well as their closely related brethren, values and principles, are central
to social work, and there are established ways of thinking about these issues in the discourse of ethics
in social work. Although contemporary problematics have their own character, nevertheless the
issues they encapsulate reflect these enduring debates. What is the right course of action to take
in a particular situation? How do we judge what is proper and how can we ensure that this
occurs? Such debates are unresolved, although at particular times and in particular domains a con-
sensus may emerge.
Background
Historically, the ethical rationale for social work practice has tended to be expressed in the language
of rights and duties, and can be seen in the emphasis of statements of ethical principles to which
social workers should conform. This has also been quite closely aligned with both caring and
virtue ethics, underpinned by the belief that the right course of action in a particular situation is
that which is located in the capacity to care and to do good located within professionals as individ-
uals and collectively in the profession. These two positions (the ‘virtue’ and ‘deontological’) take issue
with the third common ethical strand in professional thought: the consequentialist school. Here, the
emphasis is on considering the likely effects of a particular course of action to determine whether or
not it might be the right course of action. Ideas derived from this perspective underpin the evidence-
based practice movement, which emphasizes that ‘what matters is what works’. Reframed in ethical
terms, the right course of action is that which experience suggests is most likely to achieve a particu-
lar good outcome.
Evidence-based practice has attracted pointed critique across an array of dimensions, not least on
the basis that a focus on outcomes downplays the significance of process issues, the arena of both
virtue and rights/duties perspectives. The critique of evidence-based practice in social work is now
well established, and indeed, has had an effect. It is rare, now, to find unequivocal advocates of
the type of evidence-based agenda that early, strong proponents favoured. Instead, there is a gen-
eralized commitment to research or knowledge-based practice (e.gAQ2
¶
. Glasby, 2011; Orme & Shem-
mings, 2010AQ3
¶
) in which multiple sources of knowledge and understanding are synthesized in ways
that are practically useful. Reservations remain, however, about the way in which managerial pro-
cesses and expectations – as opposed to evidence-based prescriptions – insinuate themselves into
practice and undermine the capacity of workers to practise ethically. The emphasis here is on the
ways in which top-down diktats limit room for discretion and push practitioners in the direction of
compliance with preordained objectives and outcomes, which often do not suit the particular set
of circumstances that an individual service user faces.
When applied to decision-making, these debates take on a distinctive character, in which vexed
issues of professionalism and discretion intersect. Freedom in decision-making is often taken to be
a defining trait of professionalism; however, in contemporary social services, managerialism is routi-
nely represented as limiting the extent to which practitioners can utilize professional judgement as a
basis for the decisions they make. Friedson (2001) contrasts managerialism and professionalism in
terms of different work logics. In managerialism work is the means by which a production plan
can be realized; workers should be motivated by self-interest to do the jobs they are given. Profes-
sionalism, on the other hand, is characterized by a commitment to a set of values and a body of
knowledge which requires them sometimes to step outside their role as employees to be true to
their professional commitments.
In contemporary managerialized social care, practitioners are expected to comply with prescribed
procedures and frameworks for decision-making and action, often based on actuarial assumptions
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and ‘evidence-based’ claims. Decision-making is rendered technical-rational in nature, failing also to
engage with its moral/ethical dimension (Taylor & White, 2000AQ4
¶
). The application of rationality is pre-
sumed to lead to decisions which are more accurate and thus practice that is more effective, which, in
a non-process oriented framework, is a ‘good thing’. This distinction – between decision-making as
moral/emotional or technical-rational – is generally presented in dichotomous, ‘either/or’ terms. Pro-
cedural models are characterized as ‘top-down’ and risk averse, exemplifying ‘simplistic reductionism’
(McAuncliffe, 2011) in contrast to ‘reflexive’ approaches that leave much more scope for judgements
and co-construction between service user and practitioner (Hall, Juhila, Parton, & Poso, 2003) though,
as Sheppard (2006) points out, how such judgements are arrived at is ‘shrouded in mystery’. Although
there is a growing body of work challenging the accuracy and wider applicability of this represen-
tation (e.g. Evans, 2011; Evans & Harris, 2004; Hupe, Hill, & Buffat, 2015), nevertheless, these are
the dominant ‘terms of trade’ for discussion of professional decision-making within contemporary
social work.
Ethical frameworks
These debates mirror polarized positions in debates between competing ethical frameworks more
generally. Within the professional literature, ethics are often presented as a choice between
approaches or schools – most commonly three basic approaches: a consequentialist outcome-
based approach; a right/duty-based approach; and virtue-based ethics (for instance, Banks, 1995,
2012). The right/duty approach is closely associated with Kant and emphasizes the importance of
reason, freedom and consistency in ethical decision-making. Each individual is inherently ethically
significant; we are under a duty to recognize that all individuals bear the same ethical rights as
each other: you should not treat others any differently from the way you would treat yourself and
you should ‘ … act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law’ (Kant, 1994a, p. 274).
A common criticism of this approach is the absolute imperative nature of such commitments. It
requires one to follow preordained principles – regardless of consequences. For Kant, for example,
there is no such thing as ‘a white lie’ to save anybody’s feelings: ‘to be truthful in all declarations
… is a sacred and absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited by no expediency’ (Kant,
1994b, p. 281).
As well as concern about a fundamental inhumanity in an absolute commitment to principles
above people, there is also a practical problem: if all rights are inviolable, what happens when
rights or duties clash? How do you resolve the conflicts which are likely to arise in any social situation?
Consequentialist ethical approaches, such as utilitarianism, to an extent attempt to answer this
problem. Everyone counts as one, and nobody counts as more than one – no one person’s rights
trump the rights of anyone else. In situations of ethical conflict, the consequences are added up
for different sides, and the outcome that delivers the greatest aggregate utility for the group is
identified as the best ethical option. While this approach addresses, to some extent, the
problem of rights in conflict, there is a risk that it can displace individual rights in the interest
of the collective solutions. And there are practical problems with this approach. How, for instance,
do you predict or calculate consequences with sufficient certainty to warrant interfering with fun-
damental human rights and duties? How can you calculate and balance the different preferences
of different people to come up with an overall idea of the greater social good? And a greater
good for whom?
A longstanding problem faced by consequentialist and right/s duties-based approaches is that
they can be desiccated in their attempt at universal validity. They have to strip away the sense of
what it is to be human to either a hollow rationality or an improbable core motivation. Kant’s
ethical imperative is rational consistency – but it’s possible to be reasonably and consistently bad.
And consequentialism is often criticized for its strangely abstracted idea of human drives and con-
cerns. Hume,1 for instance, points out the empty space at the heart of any utilitarian calculation:
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Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same
indifference towards the means. It is requisite a sentiment should here display itself, in order to give a preference
to the useful above the pernicious tendencies… reason instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and
humanity makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial. (Hume, 1777/1917, p. 68)
These criticisms of rights-based and outcome-based approaches to ethics have been built on by
another approach, which argues that the character of the actor should be placed at the centre of
ethical decision-making. In virtue ethics, an individual develops and nurtures an ethical sensibility
beyond simply following rules and principles. Rather, such judgements amount to an intuition of
the right thing to do in any particular situation. This approach originated in the work of Aristotle,
who argued that ethical actors need to develop habits of good practice that in turn reinforce and
develop good judgement:
It is the way we behave in our dealings with other people that makes us just or unjust… like activities produce
like dispositions… it is a matter of no little importance what sort of habits we form from the earliest age – it
makes a vast difference, or rather all the difference in the world. (Aristotle, 1976, p. 92).
A strength of this approach is the recognition of people as actors in ethical situations, and that they
learn and develop their ethical judgement through engaging with ethical issues. It also alerts us to
broader concerns to do with one’s own identity and ethical well-being – ethics is, in part, concerned
with one’s own well-being as well as that of others. However, a basic problem with virtue ethics is that
it is unclear exactly what virtue means and why particular virtues are necessarily ethical. Louden, for
instance, points out that Aristotle relies on pointing to virtuous characters/habits to explain what they
entail. This is not particularly helpful in modern complex societies where: ‘ … people really do not
know each other at all that well, and where there is a wide disagreement on values’ (1997, p. 213).
Furthermore, there’s a risk that virtues are simply conventional – the established practice of a
group. Here, virtue ethics can become circular: ‘I’m ethical because what I say is ethical is what I do’!
Perhaps because of these problems, while virtue ethics have become increasingly influential in
professional ethics over the past decade (e.g. Banks & Gallagher, 2009; Clark, 2006), this has been
accompanied by increasing interests in the ethics of care and feminist ethics (Hugman, 2005AQ5
¶
;
Parton, 2003). Additionally, they share a critique of conventional professional ethics, particularly con-
sequentialist ethics, as too closely associated with consumerist rights and managerial calculation.
Although both have a long heritage, they have risen to prominence in social work of late. The distinc-
tiveness of these approaches rests partly on their rejection of the presumed dominance of conse-
quentialist ethics in contemporary social work organizations. Orthodoxy provokes critique, and
each position sets itself up as an alternative to presumed aspects of the dominant school. An
ethics of care emphasizes the role that social relationships play in society and their potential value
in practice; for a relationship to prosper, parties to it must care about each other, and in their behav-
iour act upon this sensibility. Feminist ethics, often inspired by Gilligan’s (1982) claim that there is a
distinctive female ethical perspective, take this thinking a stage further and assert the significance of
(feminine) emotion, which, they argue, is generally downplayed in comparison to (masculine) ration-
ality in judgements and decision-making.
Proponents of feminist ethics in social work emphasize the vulnerability of service users and the
need to exercise power carefully to ensure that the potential for abuse of power in professional
relationships is constrained. Within the ethics of care, which have been strongly influenced by fem-
inist ethical research and reflections, the relationship is the vehicle for ethical understanding and
commitment, and it is this priority that should guide decision-making. Proponents of each perspec-
tive do not necessarily suggest that their preferred approach will be definitively ‘right’, however ‘right’
might be defined. But the assumption is that ethical judgements will, nevertheless, be ‘more right’ if
the precepts of a particular perspective are used to guide decision-making. It is this assumption – that
it is possible for external arbiters of morality to prescribe the right and proper course of action that a
practitioner ought to take in a particular situation – that we seek to problematize in the remainder of
this paper.
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A practical perspective on ethics
To be clear, our argument is not ‘a plague on all their houses’ – by finding fault in each of these differ-
ent perspectives we do not conclude that they are all of no use. This is not our argument. Rather, we
want to suggest that each perspective we have considered, while limited, provides potentially useful
insights into ethical problems and possible contributions to their resolution. We should acknowledge
their strengths and weaknesses, and recognize that their multiplicity reflects the complex nature of
ethical questions. This complexity involves recognizing and balancing different rights and duties,
while also seeing them in a broader context of the consequences for a wide group of people, and
understanding the ethical well-being of ethical actors as agents, not just as transmitters of principles.
It’s surely uncontentious that each of these perspectives will be useful in some way as a guide for
some practitioners working with some service users in some situations, and at some times. But it is
rare for proponents of a particular perspective to offer their own preferred frameworks as optional.
The risk, we would argue, in presenting ethical perspectives as positions one must take (and in so
doing devaluing other ethical points of view) is that ethical-decision-making becomes conflated with
moralizing. Williams (1983)AQ6
¶
draws a distinction between ethics and moralizing. He criticizes morality
as ‘a peculiar institution’ which has carried over quasi-theological assumptions about the authority of
ethical ideals. ‘Morality’, he argues, sees these principles as the equivalent of legislation. They are pre-
sented as imperatives that require compliance. But on what authority? An alternative approach is
‘ethics’ that sees ethical theories as resources to help us think about these fundamental issues.
Concern for consequences, rights, procedural consistency, individual ethical creativity and virtue
are not mutually exclusive; they do not reflect different schools, but are necessary tools that can
be drawn on to analyse the nature of the ethical problem and identify an ethical response. For
O’Neil (1986, p. 27), ethical thinking ‘ …will require us to listen to other appraisals and to reflect
on and modify our own… Reflective judgment so understood is an indispensable preliminary or
background to ethical decisions about any actual case’.
The nineteenth-century philosopher J. S. Mill exemplifies the thoughtful eclecticism of sensitive
ethical thinking. Mill is often simply paired with Bentham – with the pairing used to show up incon-
sistencies in ‘classical utilitarianism’ (e.g. Banks, 2012, p. 52). However, Mill’s approach to ethical analy-
sis, while clearly influenced by Bentham, is also very different, and draws on a range of other ethical
ideas in addition to utilitarianism. For Bentham, utilitarianism was a matter of straightforward calcu-
lation of pleasure and pain to identify the right course of action. Bentham’s approach to motivation
was too narrow for Mill (Gray, 2015); it failed to take account of the quality of different sorts of plea-
sure and pain, and ignored the ethical value of personal and social improvement, in which ‘ … utility
[should be understood] in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of a man as a pro-
gressive being’ (Mill, 1979a, p. 136), which also reflected individuals’ moral responsibility to regulate
and govern their own behaviour, and to deliberate on their own desires and goals. In this, we can also
see howMill, alongside his sophisticated account of human motivation, has been influenced by virtue
ethics in his concern for well-being and growth of human actors as ethical beings (Donner, 2011). For
Mill, this also entailed a fundamental defence of liberty and autonomy as basic rights that could only
be curtailed in extreme circumstances, where others’ fundamental interests were threatened (Mill,
1979a) and a belief that utilitarian arguments can be used to provide a grounding for rights-based
ethics (Mill, 1979b, pp. 251–155).
Front-line ethicists
Ethical ideas, principles and emotions can buttress each other and they can also come into conflict.
They often have to be ‘tweaked’ to fit situations. They are starting points that help us to grasp and
explore ethical challenges and problems – and they can often make us feel uncomfortable in the
knowledge that, while we have done our best in that situation, we would have liked to do better.
We can see this in the way ethicists operate – like the example of Mill. His moral thinking was not
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one of fixed, inviolable principles, but reflected an expanding understanding of human need and
developing ethical insights (Gray, 2015).
In the same way, we can see that front-line practitioners as practical day-to-day ethicists have to
engage themselves in these sort of dynamic, ethical analyses, drawing on different ethical resources –
and generating new ethical thinking in the process – to understand a situation and think about what
to do. However, too often there is a tendency in the professional literature for ethical approaches to
propound a strongly normative approach, which risks shading into ‘this is how it should be done’.
Proponents of consequentialist perspectives, for instance, advocate the use of pro-formas, checklists
and more explicit decision-making tools to ensure – from their perspective – that judgements are
both accurate and ethical (Gambrill, 2008). And while virtue ethicists tend to be much less prescrip-
tive about the processes of decision-making, they can be critical and vocal about the morality of prac-
titioners who do not adhere to their idea of virtuous ethical practice. There is a notable tendency –
evident across the gamut of ethical schools – to emphasize the moral inadequacies of those who fail
to live up to the requirements of their abstracted pronouncements. Because practitioners have acted
in accordance with one particular ethical framework rather than another, they are deemed to have
acted either ethically or unethically; Gambrill, for instance, asserts that it is the practitioner’s
ethical duty to follow the prescriptions of the evidence-based practice approach to decision-
making (2011). Even Clark (2011) in his (convincing, in our view) characterization of decision-
making as a hermeneutic process suggests that there is a ‘right way’ for practitioners to resolve
ethical dilemmas. Similarly, Houston (2012) having rightly expounded the virtues of a pluralist take
on ethics concludes with a distinctive process to use in ethical decision-making.
For McDermott (2011)AQ7
¶
‘Good ethical decision-making is principled rather than pragmatic.’
However, surely this opposition between principle and pragamatism is problematic in a discipline
which is concerned with the need to act. As we have argued elsewhere, the ubiquity of uncertainty
in front-line practice poses particular challenges, and imposes particular restraints on social workers.
Consequently, ‘Practitioners have no option but to make decisions and act as though their choices are
objective, knowing full well that the knowledge upon which they are based is often contested and so
their judgements and decisions may be “wrong”’ (Evans & Hardy, 2010, p. 175). Whereas for some it is
the very presence of uncertainty – the absence of certainty – that necessitates recourse to ethical
frameworks, on the basis that this is precisely when we seek ‘higher order’ guidance on how to
act, our own perspective is different. The fact that practitioners have not adhered to a particular fra-
mework does not, for us, mean that they have acted unethically. Not acting in accordance with the
principles of evidence-based practice does not mean that practitioners have made an immoral jud-
gement, any more than making a decision on the basis of an actuarial scoring tool means that a social
worker’s judgement is not virtuous. Rather, in both instances, practitioners may well be making
reasoned judgements on the basis of practical considerations that, irrespective of whether or not
they adhere to a specific framework, can retain an ethical character.
Practical reasoning
The decisions that practitioners make are best understood as practical judgements emerging from
processes of practical reasoning, which lend themselves to neither prediction nor prescription. Prac-
tical ethical judgements are made in particular settings by particular people and they necessarily
draw on a range of ethical insights because
the moral field is not unitary, and the values we employ in making moral judgments sometimes have fundamen-
tally different sources… the theoretician’s quest for conceptual economy and elegance has been won at too
great a price, for the resulting reductionist definitions of moral concepts are not true to the facts of moral experi-
ence. (Louden date 216)AQ8
¶
Consequently, it seems to us, the uncertain status of the knowledge underpinning practitioner
judgements means that the reasoning on which decision-making rests cannot be simply categorized
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as ‘right’ or wrong’, moral or immoral, ethical or unethical. Deductive reasoning, which is important to
movements to instrumentalize generalized knowledge – such as evidence based practice, under
which the expectation would be that practitioners determine how to act on the basis of what the
evidence tells them, often in the form of practice guidelines or perhaps an actuarial score – is appro-
priate in some situations. Inductive reasoning, drawing upon case based knowledge, often co-con-
structed and individualized, can also be useful (Bleakly, Bligh, & Browne, 2011). It is tempting to
laud the latter over the former (as we indicated, orthodoxy provokes critique), but this would be mis-
guided. Both of these approaches have limits, and by the same token, they also both have strengths,
which, where drawn on appropriately, can enable practitioners to work to make reasonably well-
informed judgements. But both have well-established limitations, and so practitioners are still left
to make judgements in the absence of confidence as to the outcome of any decision. Using the
most apt style of reasoning and, where no consensus is evident, synthesizing strengths and limit-
ations on a case by case basis is the essence of practical reasoning (MacCormick, 2008) – for
better or worse.
The ethical dimension of practical reasoning in social work
There is now a well-established literature regarding decision-making in social work (e.g. O’Sullivan,
2011; Preston-Shoot, 2014; Taylor, 2013). A subset of this concerns the ethics of decision-making.
With a few exceptions, such work is normative rather than empirical. Where empirical work has
been undertaken, it has focused on assessing professional capabilities or testing the extent to
which practice conforms to preordained frameworks or criteria (e.g. McDermott, 2011; Taylor,
2012; Yeung, Ho, Hui-Lo, & Chan, 2010) There is also a body of work which – following Flyvbjerg
(2001) – focuses on the practicalities of decision-making, sometimes based on the Aristotlean
notion of phronesis, and loosely associated with the investigation of broad-based practitioner epis-
temologies (Petersen & Olsson, 2015; Whitaker, 2014). This literature is still developing. As such there
is a clear gap in our understanding of the practical ethics of decision-making, and a corresponding
need to understand these sense-making activities in themselves, and as such, as complex, compli-
cated and neither necessarily good nor bad, moral or immoral, ethical or unethical.
The ethical perspective
Talk about ethics can be slippery, and it can be lost in ‘value talk’ that shifts between personal inter-
ests, norms of everyday life, ideas about fundamental responsibilities and basic expectations and
goals. In identifying where the field of ethics sits, it is useful to distinguish the general sociological
idea about values as the commitments and interests of individuals and groups, from concerns that
not only relate to one’s own interests and the interests of our group, but is also fundamentally inter-
ested in the needs and interests of others – a distinction that resonates through sociological analysis
and goes back to Mead (Giddens, 1998). Plant (1970) points out that in the development of Western
moral thought, the ethical perspective reflected a shift from a system of obligations based on tra-
ditional relationships within one’s community to a wider recognition of obligations based on rational
reflection beyond familial and community ties (Plant, 1970, p. 22). Singer (1993) develops this per-
spective, arguing that a fundamental characteristic of talk about ethics is that it is not just
couched in self-regarding terms but is also concerned with the needs and aspirations of others;
and that when thinking ethically about a course of action one ‘ … cannot point only to the benefits
it brings me. We must address myself to a larger audience’ (Singer, 1993, p. 10). Furthermore, it is not
just that ethics are concerned with others as well as oneself, but that they engage fundamental con-
cerns about our ‘ … understanding of the nature of human values, of how we ought to live and what
constitutes right conduct’ (Norman, 1998, p. 1).
Within philosophical ethics a distinction is often drawn between ethics as making substantive jud-
gements about conduct in particular settings (first order or substantive ethics) and ethics that
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examine the ideas of right conduct underlying these judgements, reflecting on substantive ethical
discourse (second order or meta-ethics). Norman (1998) argues that ethicists now tend to focus on
the second perspective, while also engaging with day-to-day substantive questions, so that it can
help people who are every day engaged in ethical decision-making to examine, question, reflect
on and develop their ethical position: ‘ … to help them to clarify the terms they use, and the argu-
ments which they deploy, when making such decisions’ (Norman, 1998, p. 2). Thinking of front-
line ethics in this way helps us focus on the function of ethics, and recognize that its role is: ‘ …
not in order to preach, but in order to contribute to that common enterprise’ (Norman, 1998, p. 2).
This account of the ethical perspective is meant to give a sense of the register – the sort of talk, the
discourse, if you like – within which ethical positions are discussed and examined. Talk about values
does not equate with talk about ethics. Ethical talk relates to much fuller and more considered con-
cerns about not only one’s own interests, but also others’ interests, and about fundamental respon-
sibilities and aspirations. Approaching the ethics of front-line decision-making through this lens
entails focusing on the range of ethical ideas, principles and feelings that front-line practitioners
draw on; how they combine and deploy them in particular situations; how they learn from situations
– or not – in terms of extending and developing their ethical perspectives, and how they hold the
tension between recognizing particular rights, the consequences of action and retaining their own
sense of their professional character and project. This is not to say that every front-line professional
will always behave in this way; we can all be inconsistent and the intensity of our commitment can
vary. Some people will try and not succeed. Some will be very skilled. Others may have a ‘take’ on
ethics that is very different from conventional formulations, which some will see as indicative of inco-
herence. Nor does it suggest that these sorts of considerations can be straightforwardly illuminated.
However, there is much we can learn about both front-line social work practice – and practical ethics
itself – by exploring the degree to which the language in the register of ethics is deployed in particu-
lar situations to guide action, and, where it is deployed, how the grammar of ethical decision-making
works; what different elements are drawn upon and used; how they are combined and re-combined,
and the way particular styles or characters of ethical practice are developed, consolidated and
deployed.
The way in which practitioners’ practice combines and embodies ethical arguments suggests a
further question: how can research be attuned to the ethical register within which practitioners
engage with these issues?
One of the challenges here, particularly when we think of ethics as involving fundamental con-
cerns and commitments, is that they may well be difficult to articulate because they are felt to be
so fundamental and may be taken for granted. This is, in part, why we think it’s important to look
beyond professional codes to understand these concerns. Codes will formalize some things, but
they can’t capture the way in which wider ethical concerns come into play and operate in practice.
Codes, in themselves, also seem to us to be essentially contestable (Gallie, 1955) in that they are as
open to interpretation and question as any other text, giving a false sense of clarity about the nature
of professional ethics. At best, they are understood as frameworks within which debates occur, as a
resource which may or may not be drawn upon in the day-to-day practice of practical ethics. Timms
(1983), for instance, characterizes social work as a set of traditions, not so much defined by core
agreement about a set of values, but rather having a shared concern for key ethical issues – often
summarized as social justice – which are disputed through the medium of a shared vocabulary. Fur-
thermore, these debates do not exist within a hermetically sealed environment of ‘professional
values’, but intersect and overlap with broader organizational policy and social debates which them-
selves have an ethical character. Rather than impose external criteria (those of service users, policy-
makers, etc.) and gauge adherence to these, it is instead important to understand the self-defined
criteria of good practice and good service-delivery employed by practitioners themselves in order
to elucidate the variable factors that are drawn upon in any particular decision-making situation.
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Conclusion: investigating the ethics of decision-making
Defining the territory – the register of the discussion and the key areas of debate – is, we think, the
first necessary step to opening up the investigation of ethics and decision-making in practical reason-
ing. In doing so, certain research questions are immediately apparent: how do practitioners resolve
the ethical dilemmas that pervade decision-making in social work? In what ways are their reasoning
processes informed by ethical considerations? Which explicit or formal ethical or decision-making fra-
meworks are drawn upon, if any? How are these applied to the particular situation and with what
effects? Which other implicit, informal, non-formulaic considerations impact on decision-making pro-
cesses? We know something of each of these components, but there is much that is left untouched.
Embedded in each of these questions are a set of assumptions regarding the nature of social work
practice – its aims and objectives, the key decisions which it comprises, and the nature of professional
identity – none of which should be taken for granted. Practically, these sorts of issues suit a qualitative
approach and fit comfortably with the tradition of exploring how people understand their own world
and identify the ideas and commitments that are significant to them in operating within it.
However, there are challenges in developing this approach to researching ethics in practice that
are helpful to touch on here. Ethics is an emotive topic, because it involves fundamental commit-
ments and often commitments that people feel should bind not only themselves but others.
Ethical ideas can be difficult to talk about, because asking someone to talk about their commitments
will often involve digging down to the bedrock of understanding, pushing to know what lies behind
what seems obvious to the person concerned (Johnson, 1991). This, we think, necessitates a more
assertive form of research practice than is often the case in qualitative research; it involves challen-
ging the default cynical pose of the social researcher and probing and pushing beyond immediate
and obvious answers to draw out underlying ideas and arguments (Becker, 1971a). To balance
this, it also entails a heightened sense of micro-ethics in social research, knowing when to stop
pushing, recognizing when the interviewee has gone as far as he or she can. The other side of this
is that researchers themselves need to bring into clearer understanding their own ethical perspective
through a process of unsentimental reflection and reflexivity, to be aware of their own ethical
assumptions and to seek to articulate them so that they are aware of their own particular commit-
ments and how these may influence and sometimes close off others’ opportunities to express
their point of view and challenge their own commitments (Becker, 1971b). Undertaking this sort of
research also has the potential to be emotionally extremely draining for both interviewer and inter-
viewee. Openness to the expression of ethical positions to one another entails recognizing that
others can have fundamental commitments which are different from one’s own and – at the
extreme – may initially be unimaginable to oneself.
Although both ethics and decision-making are key areas of discussion within social work dis-
course, our knowledge and understanding of how they intersect in practice remains limited.
Indeed, it is the absence of such knowledge and understanding, we would argue, that accounts
for the tendencies towards proceduralism and moralizing in how decision-making and ethics are con-
ventionally formulated in social work discussion. Conceptual work is necessary to challenge current
disciplinary discourse with regard to ethics, decision-making and indeed, the ethics of decision-
making. Somewhat paradoxically, however, our aim is not to say this is how social workers ‘ought’
to practise, or to what extent, in what ways, according to which conventions (ethical or otherwise)
decision makers should formulate their judgements, or according to which criteria these decisions
might be judged. Indeed, following Millgram (2005)AQ9
¶
, we do not advocate a particular moral perspec-
tive. Rather, our interests here are in scoping out a future research agenda that has the potential to
illuminate the intersections between practice and ethical thinking and reflection in novel and – for
social work, at least – unconventional ways. In our view research that focuses on the intersection
between varying forms of practicality and morality is best placed to further the debate in this con-
tentious area of social work.
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Note
1. Hume, while he is known primarily as a philosopher, was at the time better known for his work as an historian and
what is evident from his work is a rich sense of ethical thinking grounded in an historical and social understanding
of ethical commitments and motivation.
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